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CHANGE-IN-CONTROL CLAUSES: IS
DELAWARE LAW RESURRECTING THE
DEAD?
INTRODUCTION
Change-in-control clauses are one of the most popular and innova-
tive defensive tactics to corporate takeovers.' Commonly in the form
of shareholder rights plans and often disparagingly referred to as
"poison pills,",2 no other defense strategy has mutated more rapidly,
with every variation and innovation creating new litigation. Target
companies adopt change-in-control clauses to deter corporate raiders'
abusive tactics by making takeover attempts extremely expensive.
To encourage negotiation with raiders, the clauses are redeemable by
targets' boards for a nominal price prior to the acquisition. 5 Origi-
nally upheld by the Delaware Supreme Court in Moran v. Household
International, Inc.,6 change-in-control clauses defend against corpo-
rate raiders' naked tender offers. 7 In response, raiders abandoned
naked tender offers and began employing tender offers coupled with
proxy solicitations. 8 By waging these proxy contests, raiders hope to
unseat incumbent directors and elect a new board capable of redeem-
ing targets' rights plans.
RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS 740 (2d ed. 1995).
2 Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, the firm credited with originally devising the share-
holder rights plan, objects to this common characterization: "[d]espite ... substantial evidence
of the beneficial effects of rights plans, they will still be called 'poison pills.' This is a most
unfortunate misnomer. A rights plan is neither a pill nor poisonous." Id. at 741 n.7 (quoting
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, The Shareholder Rights Plan, Mar. 1994).
3 Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 728 A.2d 25, 27 (Del. Ch.
1998), affd on other grounds, Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del.
1998).
4 GILSON & BLACK, supra note 1, at 741.
5 Id
6 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
7 Shawn C. Lese, Note, Preventing Control from the Grave: A Proposal for Judicial
Treatment of Dead Hand Provisions in Poison Pills, 96 COLuM. L. REV. 2175, 2175 (1996).
8 Id.
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Faced with raiders' aggressive new tactics, targets began adding
features to strengthen their change-in-control clauses. 9 Specifically,
targets first included "dead hand," or continuing director features,
which allow only the directors in office at the time the board adopted
the provision (or their designated successors) to redeem a rights
plan. 10 These features evolved into the "slow hand" variety, which
preclude all directors of a newly elected board from redeeming a
rights plan for a limited time." Dead hand and slow hand features
provided effective protection against proxy contests until Delaware
courts invalidated both features.' 2
Against this background, this Comment examines continuing di-
rector provisions in light of the Delaware Court of Chancery's recent
decision in California Public Employees' Retirement System v. Coul-
ter ("CalPERS").'3 This Comment concludes that potent defenses
may still be available against raiders, but CalPERS did not create one,
because all that the provision at issue did was define an event which
triggered additional payments to corporate executives. Part I lays a
foundation by explaining Delaware's relevant statutes. Part II dis-
cusses two landmark Delaware decisions. Part III analyzes the Dela-
ware Court of Chancery's decision in CalPERS. Part IV examines the
change-in-control contractual approach.
I. DELAWARE STATUTES
A company's board of directors can adopt change-in-control
clauses without shareholder approval. "4 Typically, boards enact
shareholder rights plans as precautionary defenses' 5 but can quickly
enact a plan when faced with a specific takeover threat. 16 The board
retains power to remove the change-in-control clause by redeeming
9 Xuequing Linda Ji, Comment, A New Look at Dead Hand Provisions in Poison Pills:
Are They Per Se Invalid After Toll Brothers and Quickturn?, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 223, 224-25
(2000).
10 Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quicktum Design Sys., Inc., 728 A.2d 25, 28 (Del. Ch.
1998), affid on other grounds, Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del.
1998).
I Id.
12 See Mentor Graphics Corp., 728 A.2d at 52 (holding slow hand features invalid); Car-
mody v. Toll Bros., Inc., 723 A.2d 1180, 1195 (Del. Ch. 1998) (holding dead hand features
invalid).
13 No. 19191, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 54 (Del. Ch. Apr. 21, 2005) [hereinafter CaIPERS].
14 See Neil C. Rifkind, Should Uninformed Shareholders Be a Threat Justifying Defensive
Action by Target Directors in Delaware?: "Just Say No" After Moore v. Wallace, 78 B.U. L.
REv. 105, 111 (1998) (providing that the "great power of poison pills derives from the board's
ability to adopt them without shareholder approval").
15 Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1350 (Del. 1985).
16 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1985).
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the rights at a nominal price. 17 This power improves the board's bar-
gaining power in merger negotiations; the board can determine
whether to redeem the rights, or to retain them, threatening the raider
with dilution of the target's stock. 18
Change-in-control clauses can provide shareholders with several
benefits in the event of a tender offer: they protect shareholders from
coercive two-tiered tender offers, they give the board adequate time to
consider alternatives, and they ensure that shareholders receive full
value because the board can wield the pill to demand a higher price.' 9
Critics, however, argue that such clauses entrench incumbent direc-
tors and remove control from shareholders.2°
Delaware section 141 governs a company's board of directors. An
understanding of this section is critical to the assessment of change-
in-control clauses. Section 141(a) establishes the board's role in cor-
porate governance. Section 141 (a) provides:
The business and affairs of every corporation organized under
this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in
this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation. If any such
provision is made in the certificate of incorporation, the pow-
ers and duties conferred or imposed upon the board of direc-
tors by this chapter shall be exercised or performed to such
extent and by such person or persons as shall be provided in
the certificate of incorporation. 2'
In Moran v. Householder International, Inc., the Delaware Supreme
Court held that section 141(a) conferred authority to adopt change-in-
control clauses.22 Additionally, section 141(d) allows differentiated
voting powers among directors, but the company's charter must ex-
press such distinctions. Section 141(d) provides:
The directors of any corporation organized under this chapter
may, by the certificate of incorporation or by an initial bylaw,
17 GILSON & BLACK, supra note 1, at 744 (providing a same shareholder rights plan and
noting that the "rights are redeemable by the company's board of directors at a price of $.01 per
right at any time prior to the acquisition by a person or group of beneficial ownership" over the
requisite threshold).
18 Brian J. McTear, Comment, Has the Evolution of the Poison Pill Come to an End?-
Carmody v. Toll Brothers, Inc.; Mentor Graphics, Inc. v. Quicktum Design Systems, Inc., 24
DEL. J. CORP. L. 881,885-86 (1999).
19 Id. at 886.
20 Id. at 886-87.
21 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2005).
22 Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1353 (Del. 1985) (citing Unocal Corp.
v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953 (1985)).
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or by a bylaw adopted by a vote of the stockholders, be
divided into 1, 2 or 3 classes .... [A]nd [the directors] have
such voting powers as shall be stated in the certificate of
incorporation.23
II. DELAWARE CASE LAW
A. Dead Hand Pills: Carmody v. Toll Brothers, Inc.
The Delaware Court of Chancery first addressed dead hand fea-
tures in Carmody v. Toll Brothers, Inc.24 Toll Brothers, a Delaware
corporation, adopted a Shareholders' Rights Plan ("Rights Plan"),
which contained a dead hand feature. It prevented "any directors of
Toll Brothers, except those who were in office as of the date of the
Rights Plan's adoption (June 12, 1997) or their designated successors,
from redeeming the Rights until they expire on June 12, 2007. "25 The
Rights Plan defined a "Continuing Director" as:
(i) any member of the Board of Directors of the Company,
while such person is a member of the Board, who is not an
Acquiring Person, or an Affiliate [as defined] or Associate [as
defined] of an Acquiring Person, or a representative or nomi-
nee of an Acquiring Person or of any such Affiliate or Asso-
ciate, and was a member of the Board prior to the date of this
Agreement, or (ii) any Person who subsequently becomes a
23 The full text of section 141(d) provides:
The directors of any corporation organized under this chapter may, by the certificate
of incorporation or by an initial bylaw, or by a bylaw adopted by a vote of the stock-
holders, be divided into 1, 2 or 3 classes; the term of office of those of the first class
to expire at the annual meeting next ensuing; of the second class 1 year thereafter; of
the third class 2 years thereafter; and at each annual election held after such classifi-
cation and election, directors shall be chosen for a full term, as the case may be, to
succeed those whose terms expire. The certificate of incorporation may confer upon
holders of any class or series of stock the right to elect I or more directors who shall
serve for such term, and have such voting powers as shall be stated in the certificate
of incorporation. The terms of office and voting powers of the directors elected sepa-
rately by the holders of any class or series of stock may be greater than or less than
those of any other director or class of directors. In addition, the certificate of incor-
poration may confer upon I or more directors, whether or not elected separately by
the holders of any class or series of stock, voting powers greater than or less than
those of other directors. If the certificate of incorporation provides that I or more di-
rectors shall have more or less than I vote per director on any matter, every reference
in this chapter to a majority or other proportion of the directors shall refer to a major-
ity or other proportion of the votes of the directors.
tit. 8, § 141(d).
24 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998).
25 Id. at 1184.
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member of the Board, while such Person is a member of the
Board, who is not an Acquiring Person, or an Affiliate [as de-
fined] or Associate [as defined] of an Acquiring Person, or a
representative or nominee of an Acquiring Person or of any
such Affiliate or Associate, if such Person's nomination for
election or election to the Board is recommended or approved
by a majority of the Continuing Directors.26
Carmody, a Toll Brothers shareholder, challenged the dead hand
feature on both statutory and fiduciary duty grounds. For his statutory
claim, Carmody claimed that the provision created two different
classes of directors-those who can redeem the pill and those who
cannot. 27 Pursuant to sections 141(a) and (d), such restrictions or di-
rector classifications are invalid, unless set forth in the certificate of
incorporation.28 He also argued that adoption of the dead hand feature
was a twofold breach of the board's fiduciary duty of loyalty.29 First,
if a raider waged a proxy contest and won, its new directors could not
redeem the pill. 30 This made an unsolicited offer for the target
unlikely. 31 Second, in a proxy vote, the provision eliminated all prac-
tical choice for shareholders who want to elect a new board that will
32
redeem the provision. From these two effects, Carmody claimed
that the "only purpose that the 'dead hand' provision could serve is to
discourage future acquisition activity by making any proxy contest to
replace incumbent board members an exercise in futility.
33
Toll Brothers responded that nothing in the Rights Plan forced
shareholders to vote for incumbent directors; the Rights Plan did not
nullify a proxy contest as a means for a raider to gain control and
therefore was not invalid per se. 34 Noting that boards do not need
special charter authority to delegate specific tasks to committees,
35
Toll Brothers argued that the "'dead hand' provision should be
viewed as tantamount to a delegation to a special committee ... of the
exclusive power to redeem the Rights."36
Toll Brothers also argued that the Rights Plan did not violate any
fiduciary duty. Because Toll Brothers was vulnerable to a hostile
26 Id (quoting Rights Plan, § 1 (g)).
27 Id. at 1189.
28 tit. 8, § 141(a), (d).
29 Carmody, 723 A.2d at 1184.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 1190.
35 Id.
36 Id.
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takeover and a majority of its board were independent directors who
reasonably perceived a threat to its business, "adopting the Rights
Plan was a proportionate response that the 'dead hand' feature did not
render disproportionate, because the Rights Plan does not preclude
offers that are fair and noncoercive. 37 Finally, Toll Brothers con-
tended that the Rights Plan did not preclude shareholders from elect-
ing a new board, and "even though that board may be unable to re-
deem the Rights, that violates no fiduciary duty, because [Delaware
law] permits a board to interfere with the voting process in suffi-
ciently compelling circumstances.' 38
The court determined that Carmody stated legally sufficient claims
that the dead hand feature violated sections 141(a) and (d). 39 First, to
create voting power distinctions, section 141(d) requires a classified
board and such distinctions must be set forth in the certificate of in-
corporation. 40 Second, the board's adoption of the dead hand feature
was ultra vires. Section 141(d) grants the right to elect directors to
shareholders, not to the board or a special committee thereof.4' The
court added that, "[a]bsent express language in the charter, nothing in
Delaware law suggests that some directors of a public corporation
may be created less equal than other directors, and certainly not by
unilateral board action.",42 Since the charter did not contain such "ex-
press language," the dead hand feature transgressed the shareholders'
right to elect directors capable of redeeming the pill, thereby making
it ultra vires. 43 Third, section 141(a) mandates that a corporation's
board of directors manage its business "except as may be otherwise
provided.., in its certificate of incorporation." 44 The dead hand fea-
ture severely hindered a newly elected board's ability to achieve a
business combination because the new directors would not possess
the "power to redeem the pill without obtaining the consent of the
'Continuing Directors,' who (it may be assumed) would constitute a
minority of the board., 45 Because of this, the dead hand feature inter-
fered with the "board's power to protect fully the corporation's (and
37 Id.
38 Id; see Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661-62 (Del. Ch. 1988) (de-
termining that a "compelling justification" must be shown for a board's interference in the
voting process after the board added two new directors which prevented shareholders from
electing a majority of new directors).
39 Carmody, 723 A.2d at 1190.
40 Id. at 1191.
4' DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2005); Carmody, 723 A.2d at 1191.
42 Carmody, 723 A.2d at 1191.
43 Id.
44 tit. 8, § 141(a).
45 Carmody, 723 A.2d at 1191.
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its shareholders') interests in a transaction that is one of the most fun-
damental and important in the life of a business enterprise. 4 6
The court assessed Carmody's fiduciary duty claim under the two-
prong duty of loyalty analysis. First, since Carmody alleged that the
dead hand feature "purposefully disenfranchise[d] the company's
shareholders without any compelling justification, the board
needed to satisfy the more exacting standard set forth in Blasius In-
dustries v. Atlas Corp.48 The court found that such disenfranchise-
ment would occur because shareholders would have to vote for in-
cumbent directors, even if they disagree with their policies, if they
want a board that is capable of redeeming the Rights Plan.49 More-
over, "[a] claim that the directors have unilaterally 'create[d] a struc-
ture in which shareholder voting is either impotent or self defeating'
is necessarily a claim of purposeful disenfranchisement., 50 Further,
the court recognized "that the shareholder vote has primacy in our
system of corporate governance because it is the 'ideological under-
pinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests."' 51 For
these reasons, the court held that Carmody stated a cognizable claim
under Blasius and Delaware law.52
Turning to the second prong of its duty of loyalty analysis, the
court explored whether the dead hand feature was an "unreasonable
defensive measure" under Unocal.'' 53 Claims under Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co. 54 and Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp. 55
46 Id.
47 Id. at 1193.
48 In situations not involving a claim that the defensive measures purposefully disenfran-
chise shareholders, courts will evaluate the issue under the Unocal/Unitrin standard. Since
Carmody alleged such purposeful disenfranchisement, the Blasius standard is operative. The
Delaware Supreme Court articulated the Blasius standard as "[a] board's unilateral decision to
adopt a defensive measure touching 'upon issues of control' that purposefully disenfranchises
its shareholders is strongly suspect under Unocal, and cannot be sustained without a 'compel-
ling justification."' Id. (quoting Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 92 n.3 (Del. 1992)); Blasius
Indus, v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661-64 (Del. Ch. 1988).
49 Carmody, 723 A.2d at 1193.
50 Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Jeffrey N. Gordon, "Just Say Never? " Poi-
son Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19
CARDOZO L. REv. 511, 540 (1997)).
51 Id. (quoting Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 659).
52 Id. at 1194.
53 Id.
54 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). Unocal articulated the rationale and standard of review ap-
plicable to a board's adoption or retention of defensive measures, stating that "[blecause of the
omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those
of the corporation and its shareholders, there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial exami-
nation at the threshold before the protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred."
Id. at 954 (emphasis added).
55 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). Unitrin restated the Unocal standard in the following two
part test:
2006]
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require enhanced scrutiny. According to Unitrin, a "defensive meas-
ure is disproportionate (i.e., unreasonable) if it is either coercive or
preclusive. 56 Carmody claimed that the dead hand feature was coer-
cive, because it forced shareholders to vote for incumbent directors or
their designees. 57 Carmody also alleged that the dead hand feature
was preclusive, because it made "an offer for the Company much
more unlikely since it eliminate[d] use of a proxy contest as a possi-
ble means to gain control," thereby rendering "future contests for
corporate control of Toll Brothers prohibitively expensive and effec-
tively impossible. 58 The court agreed and held that the dead hand
feature was "disproportionate and unreasonable under Unocal."59
B. Slow Hand Pills: Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design
Systems, Inc. and Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro
Shortly after his decision in Carmody, Vice Chancellor Jacobs
confronted the slow hand pill in Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn
Design Systems, Inc. 60 Mentor made an unsolicited cash tender offer
for all of Quickturn's outstanding common shares, coupled with a
proxy solicitation to replace Quickturn's board.6'
Quickturn's board declared the offer as inadequate and advised
shareholders to reject it.62 The board then adopted two defenses. First,
it took an existing bylaw that allowed "shareholders . . . entitled to
cast not less than ten percent (10%) of the votes" to call a special
meeting, and amended it. The amended bylaw allowed the board to
delay the meeting for at least ninety days, but not more than one hun-
dred days from the date of the proxy.63 Second, the board eliminated
the dead hand feature 64 from its shareholder rights plan ("Rights
First, a reasonableness test, which is satisfied by a demonstration that the board of
directors had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and
effectiveness existed, and [slecond, a proportionality test, which is satisfied by a
demonstration that the board of directors' defensive response was reasonable in rela-
tion to the threat posed.
Id. at 1373.
56 Carmody, 723 A.2d at 1195.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 728 A.2d 25 (Del. Ch. 1998), affd on other grounds, Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v.
Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998).
61 Mentor Graphics, 728 A.2d at 33. The cash tender offer of $12.125 was approximately
a 50 percent premium over the immediate pre-offer price. Id.
62 Id. at 35.
63 Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
64 Quickturn's dead hand feature included a limited "continuing director" provision that
was operative only when a raider that owned more than 15 percent of its common stock waged a
[Vol. 56:3
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Plan") and replaced it with a slow hand feature. 65 The amended
Rights Plan provided that
in the event that a majority of the Board of Directors of the
Company is elected by stockholder action at an annual or
special meeting of stockholders, then until the 180th day fol-
lowing the effectiveness of such election (including any post-
ponement or adjournment thereof), the Rights shall not be re-
deemed if such redemption is reasonably likely to have the
purpose or effect of facilitating a Transaction with an Inter-
ested Person.66
The Rights Plan defined an "Interested Person" as
any Person who (i) is or will become an Acquiring Person if
such Transaction were to be consummated or an Affiliate or
Associate of such a Person, and (ii) is, or directly or indirectly
proposed, nominated or financially supported, a director of
[Quickturn] in office at the time of consideration of such
Transaction who was elected at an annual or special meeting
of stockholders.67
Quickturn's bylaw amendment delayed a shareholder-called meeting
for at least three months, while the slow hand feature prevented a new
Mentor-nominated board from redeeming the Rights Plan for six
months. 68 Taken together, the bylaw amendment and slow hand fea-
ture would have delayed Mentor's acquisition for at least nine
months. 69
Mentor challenged Quickturn's slow hand feature on three
grounds. First, it interfered with the right of Quicktum shareholders to
elect a board of their choice, "in derogation of the principles articu-
lated in Blasius"70 This interfered with the shareholders' franchise,
because even if Quickturn shareholders desired a sale to Mentor, the
slow hand feature may compel them to vote for incumbent directors
-- directors capable of accomplishing a sale within six months---or
proxy contest to replace a majority of Quicktum's board. Once operative, only the "continuing
directors"-the directors in office at the time the board adopted this dead hand feature--could
redeem the pill. Id. at 43.
65 Id. at 35 (referring to Quicktum's slow hand feature as a Deferred Redemption Plan).
66 Id. at 35 n.40.
67 Id. (second alteration in original).
66 Id. at 36.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 44.
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abstain entirely from the vote.7 ' Second, Mentor claimed the slow
hand feature violated Unocal/Unitrin's fiduciary principles because it
"was a disproportionate response to any threat reasonably perceived
by the Mentor bid.",72 Third, Mentor argued that the slow hand feature
violated section 141(a), because it prevented a newly elected board
from redeeming the rights plan, even if the board's fiduciary duty
required it to do SO. 73 This improperly denied "any newly elected
board of its core authority to manage the corporation.,
74
The Court of Chancery did not reach Mentor's Blasius or statutory
claims. 75 Instead, the court held that Quickturn's board violated its
fiduciary duties under Unocal and Unitrin by adopting the slow hand
feature.76 The court determined that the board acted from fear that
"Quicktum shareholders might mistakenly, in ignorance of Quick-
turn's true value, accept Mentor's inadequate offer, and elect a new
board that would prematurely sell the company. '77 Analyzing the first
prong of Unocal/Unitrin, the court found that the tender offer and
proxy contest constituted a legally cognizable threat.78 Next, the court
evaluated the slow hand feature's proportionality to that threat-the
second prong of Unocal/Unitrin. Although the- court rejected Men-
tor's arguments that the slow hand feature was coercive and preclu-
sive, it held that the slow hand feature was disproportionate for two
reasons: (1) it delayed a new board's sale of Quickturn for six months
only when such transaction involved an Interested Person (i.e., Men-
tor), and (2) pursuant to Quickturn's bylaw amendment, if sharehold-
ers can inform themselves in three months, it is unreasonable to con-
clude that a board requires six months. 79 For these reasons, the court
held the slow hand feature invalid. 80
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the decision, but based its
conclusion on section 141(a). 81 The court stressed that "[o]ne of the
most basic tenets of Delaware corporate law is that the board of direc-
tors has the ultimate responsibility for managing the business and
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 The court acknowledged that, "a disposition of this issue on fiduciary, rather than upon
statutory, grounds may appear counterintuitive .... [But] the statutory argument... was not
adequately developed by the parties." Id. at 44 n.73.
76 Id. at 44.
77 Id. at 46.
78 Id. at 45-46.
79 Id. at 50-52.
so Id. at 52 (holding the slow hand feature invalid, but upholding the bylaw).
S Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1291-93 (Del. 1998).
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affairs of a corporation. ' ' 82 Section 141(a) requires that a company's
charter explicitly state any limitation on the board's authority; 83
Quickturn's charter had no such limitation.84 The court determined
that the slow hand feature would prevent the board from performing
its fundamental duties for six months. 85 The court admitted that the
slow hand feature would only limit the board's authority in one re-
spect--contracting for the sale of Quickturn-but noted that this is an
"area of fundamental importance to the shareholders., 86
The court found that the slow hand feature would "prevent[ ] a
newly elected board of directors from completely discharging its fi-
duciary duties to protect fully the interests of Quickturn and its stock-
holders. 87 Since "no defensive measure can be sustained which
would require a new board of directors to breach its fiduciary duty,"
the slow hand feature was invalid under Delaware law. 88
III. OVERBLOWN FEARS?: CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES'
RETIREMENT SYSTEM V. COULTER
Some feared that Carmody and Mentor Graphics Corp. would for-
bid a board from executing contracts that limit its discretion. Vice
Chancellor Noble's ruling in CalPERS suggests such fears are over-
blown.89 This case involved an agreement by Lone Star Steakhouse &
Saloon, Inc. to pay additional compensation to its senior management
in the event of a change-in-control in order to encourage senior man-
agement to stay with Lone Star, despite any threat of such change. 90
The change-in-control contracts ("Contracts") provided senior
management with additional compensation in the case of (1) a shift in
shareholder voting power, (2) a change in the composition of the
board, (3) a merger or similar transaction, or (4) liquidation. 91 Only
Lone Star's founder and largest shareholder, Defendant Coulter, how-
ever, would receive his "golden parachute ' 92 solely upon the occur-
82 Quickturn Design Systems, 721 A.2d at 1291.
13 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2005).
84 Quickturn Design Systems, 721 A.2d at 1291.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 1291-92.
87 Id. at 1292.
88 Id. at 1292-93.
89 Cal. Pub. Emp. Retirement Sys. v. Coulter, No. 19191, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 54, at *21(Del. Ch. Apr. 21, 2005) (holding that a contractual clause which entitled corporate executives
to payments, if a majority of the company's directors were displaced, to be legal).
90 Id. at *3.
91 Id.
92 A golden parachute is a very popular tactic employed by targets that "award[s] very fa-
vorable employment contracts to its senior management which become effective only in the
event of a change in control." GILSON & BLACK, supra note 1, at 768.
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rence of one of these events. 93 The Contracts required the happening
of a second trigger, such as a change in their duties, before anyone
else received such payment. 94 The Contracts provided that a change-
in-control occurred if
[t]he individuals who, as of January 3, 2001, are members of
the Company's Board of Directors (the "Existing Directors"),
cease, at or prior to January 3, 2003, for any reason, to consti-
tute at least a majority of the number of authorized directors
of the Company as determined in the manner prescribed in
the Company's Certificate of Incorporation and Bylaws; pro-
vided, however, that if the election, or nomination for elec-
tion, by the Company's stockholders of any new director was
approved by a vote of at least a majority of the Existing Di-
rectors, such new director shall be considered an Existing
Director; provided further, however, that no individual shall
be considered an Existing Director if such individual initially
assumed office as a result of either an actual or threatened
election contest or other actual or threatened solicitation of
proxies by or on behalf of anyone other than the Board of Di-
rectors (a "Proxy Contest"), including by reason of any
agreement intended to avoid or settle any election contest or
Proxy Contest.
95
The votes of new directors not approved as existing directors (effec-
tively "continuing directors") were not counted in determining
whether subsequent new directors would be considered continuing
directors. If continuing directors voted to approve the new directors,
then the new directors became continuing directors and the change-in-
control payments would not occur. 96
Ten Contracts were involved. Although their terms varied, the
definition of "change of control" was constant. All Contracts were
effective January 3, 2001, and, by their terms, expired on January 3,
2003. 97 The Contracts would have likely cost the company between
$10 and $30 million,98 but Lone Star never made any payments and
the Contracts were not renewed. The California Public Employees'
93 CaIPERS, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 54, at *5 n.3.
9 Id.
95 Id. at *34.
96 Id. at *18.
97 Id. at *6.
98 See id. at *5 n.2 (noting that Lone Star claimed "its exposure was less than $10 million"
while CalPERS argued that payments to two defendants alone "could have exceeded $30 mil-
lion").
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Retirement System (CalPERS), however, contended that the Con-
tracts damaged Lone Star by causing Bruckmann, Rosser, Sherrill &
Co. to abandon a plan to acquire Lone Star.99
CalPERS moved for summary judgment, arguing that the continu-
ing director provision in the Contracts violated both section 141(d)
and the board's fiduciary duty because it granted individual directors
differential voting powers based on classifications not present in Lone
Star's certificate of incorporation, thereby conflicting with Car-
mody. 1
00
The Court of Chancery recognized that the board would "not vote
on the specific question of whether the new director will be an 'Exist-
ing Director'; rather, the continuing director provision provided "an
after-the-vote measure for ascertaining whether there is continuity
within the Board even though its membership has changed."' 01 The
Contracts referenced the board's vote simply to determine the manag-
ers' rights to payments and did not deny voting rights to any new,
noncontinuing directors. 102 Ultimately, the court ruled that the con-
tinuing director provision contravened neither section 141(d) nor
Carmody since it did not limit or expand directors' voting powers.' 03
Although the court determined that the Contracts were a reason-
able means to avoid change-in-control payments, they may not be the
only acceptable approach.10 4 While the court held that Lone Star's
Contracts did not pose the corporate governance defects present in
Carmody, it stated that "incumbent directors may not employ a simi-
lar device, in a different context, to deprive various directors of their
voting power or to deprive them of the capacity to exercise that power
when necessary."105 The court emphasized that every decision de-
pends upon its factual context; under certain circumstances, a provi-
sion comparable to Lone Star's could constitute a breach of the
board's obligations to shareholders. 0 6 The court, however, did not
provide specific examples.
The court highlighted that the Contracts had a limited, two-year
duration, while the challenged dead hand provision in Carmody had a
ten-year term. 107 This difference, however, is not crucial. For exam-
ple, even if the Rights Plan in Carmody had a two-year limit, the
99 Id. at *6 n.5.
'DOId. at *15.
01 Id. at *19-20.
1021d. at *20.
103 Id.
041d. at *21-22.05Id. at *22 n.25; see, e.g., Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971).
101 CalPERS, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 54, at *22 n.25.
1071d.; Carmody v. Toll Brothers, Inc., 723 A.2d 1180, 1184 (Del. Ch. 1998).
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board would not have full power to manage the corporation. More-
over, assuming the two-year limit in CalPERS made a difference,
nothing would stop a corporation from adopting such an agreement
and then extending it every year. The real difference between the two
provisions lies in their effects.
IV. RESURRECTING THE DEAD?
Viewed together, CaIPERS, Carmody, and Mentor Graphics Corp.
seem to signal that defensive measures making a change-in-control
impossible demand higher judicial scrutiny than other measures that
contain continuing director provisions such as ERAs (employee reten-
tion agreements). 10 8 But is the effect not the same? All three cases
involved devices that deterred raiders from taking control of tar-
gets. 10 9 The difference is that CalPERS did not entail a coercive or
preclusive defense.
A. Lone Star's ERAs: Neither Preclusive nor Coercive
The difference is relevant because of Delaware sections 141 (a) and
(d). According to Delaware law, defenses that are neither preclusive
nor coercive must only be reasonable. °"0 The arrangements in Car-
mody and Quickturn, found to be preclusive and coercive, severely
limited their boards' ability to govern the corporation. The dead hand
and slow hand features prevented a newly elected board from redeem-
ing the defenses for at least six months; they left shareholders only
one choice if they wanted to elect directors with authority to redeem
the pills. A newly elected board, therefore, could not sell the com-
pany-the most significant transaction in a company's existence. This
violated section 141 (a). "'1
Nothing in the Lone Star ERAs had this effect; all directors were
capable of taking any actions that were in the best interests of the
108 Stephen Fraidin, Continuing Director Provisions Revisited, M&A NOTES (KIRKLAND &
ELLIS LLP), May 2005, at 1; see All "Dead Hands" Are Not Created Equal, NEWSL. OF THE
ABA SEC. TASK FORCE ON DiR. & OFFICER LIAB., http://www.abanet.org/buslaw
/commtittees/CL9960000pub/newsletter/20050728000000.htn (last visited Jan. 21, 2006)
(noting the difference in judicial treatment in the context of employee retention agreements from
shareholder rights plans).
109 CalPERS alleged the ERA led to the expiration of Bruckmann Rosser's letter of intent
to acquire all the shares of Lone Star. CaIPERS, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 54, at *6 n.5.
10 See Unitrin Corp. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1387-88 (Del. 1995) (providing
that "[i]f a defensive measure ... is not either coercive or preclusive, the Unocal proportionality
test requires the focus of enhanced judicial scrutiny to shift to [reasonableness]").
I Additionally, the Carmody court determined that the dead hand feature violated section
141(d), but neither the Delaware Court of Chancery in Mentor Graphics nor the Delaware
Supreme Court in Quickturn addressed this section.
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corporation. The continuing director provision was in the ERAs be-
tween Lone Star and senior management, not a shareholder rights
plan. The court acknowledged that the ERAs required the board's
vote to determine the rights of senior managers to payments. 112 Even
though the votes counted for only continuing directors, this did not
differentiate the directors' voting powers because the question an-
swered by such vote does not require board action." 3 Therefore,
unlike Carmody, the ERAs did not violate section 141(d).
CalPERS claimed that the ERAs were coercive and preclusive be-
cause the election of certain directors could trigger the ERAs, thereby
making Bruckmann Rosser's acquisition of Lone Star prohibitively
expensive. But the ERAs, though increasing the cost of the acquisi-
tion, did not make it impossible. The potency of the Lone Star ERAs
was in their potential cost-$10 million to $30 million."14 The non-
binding letter of intent between Lone Star and Bruckmann Rosser
provided for the acquisition of Lone Star's common stock for
$20.50." " As of April 26, 2002 (just over a week before the letter of
intent expired), Lone Star had 24,754,980 common shares out-
standing.16 The ERAs represented possible payments between 1.97
percent and 5.91 percent of the deal value. This may have dissuaded
Bruckmann Rosser from acquiring Lone Star,' '7 but it did not make it
impossible; the ERAs simply made it more costly.
If the provision in CalPERS were invalid, then all ERAs should be
invalid. This is not the case; instead, ERAs are common and often
upheld by courts in Delaware and other states. 118 Further, many other
common arrangements (e.g., termination fees in acquisition agree-
ments) impose costs on competing bids. For example, for canceling
Johnson & Johnson's agreement to acquire Guidant Corporation for
112 CalPERS, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 54, at *20.
113Id. at *20 n.23.
1
4 See id. at *5 n.2 (providing that Lone Star claimed "its exposure was less than $10 mil-
lion" while CaIPERS argued that payments to certain defendants "could have exceeded $30
million").
115 Press Release, Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc., Letter of Intent for Sale and
Merger of the Company for $20.50 Per Share in Cash (Apr. 2, 2002), avaliable at
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/883670/000092189502000175/form8k0l657_04022002.htm.
116 Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 1 (May 3,
2002), available at http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/883670/000092189502000240/form 1 Oq
01657_03192002.htm.
"7See Press Release, Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc., Expiration of the Letter of
Intent for Sale of the Company and Projected Revenue, EBITDA and Earnings Per Share for
2002 (May 6, 2002), available at http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/883670/000092189
502000247/form8kex991_0165705042002.htm (announcing that the letter of intent expired).
18 See GILSON & BLACK, supra note I, at 768 (providing a description of golden para-
chutes and summarizing an analysis of a sample of ninety firms that adopted ERAs).
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$24.2 billion," 9 Guidant must pay Johnson & Johnson a $705 million
termination fee. 120 This represents 2.91 percent of the deal. Delaware
courts have upheld termination fees ranging 2 percent to 4 percent.121
Even if a court determined that the guidelines for termination fee
agreements also apply to ERAs, Lone Star's ERAs were probably
within the acceptable range. Of course, a court would need more in-
formation to assess the actual cost, but even if the ERAs were valued
at $20 million, they would only represent 3.94 percent of the deal. 1
22
Courts, however, should not extend to ERAs the amount guide-
lines applicable to termination fees. The purposes of these two ar-
rangements are different. Delaware courts view termination fees as
liquidated damages, meant to cover fees and expenses, 123 whereas
ERAs seek to retain managers faced with the instability of hostile
takeover situations. 124 Because of this, judicial review of ERAs
should focus solely on what amount is reasonably necessary to keep
valued managers.
B. ERAs Are Not "Defenses"
Classifying ERAs as defenses is debatable for two reasons.125
First, ERA payments are rarely large enough to deter raiders. 26 Sec-
ond, companies adopt ERAs to eliminate potential conflicts between
target shareholders and target managers. 127 Managers faced with a
possible change-in-control are often uncertain of their future with the
company and therefore about their financial security. 128 ERAs reduce
such concerns by providing financial security, thereby allowing man-
agers to focus on their company's shareholders' best interests during
1 9 Press Release, Johnson & Johnson, Guidant Corporation and Johnson & Johnson An-
nounce New Definitive Acquisition Agreement (Jan. 13, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/200406/000095012306000395/y16559exv99wl .htm.
120 Press Release, Johnson & Johnson, Johnson & Johnson Statement Regarding Guidant
Corporation (Jan. 25, 2006), avaliable at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/200406/
000095015706000071/ex99-1 .htm.
121 See Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 695 A.2d 43, 50 (Del. 1997) (upholding a $550 mil-
lion termination fee that represented about 2 percent of Bell Atlantic Corp.'s market capitaliza-
tion); Goodwin v. Live Ent'mt, Inc., No. 15765, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 5, at *69 (Del. Ch. Jan.
25, 1999), aff'd, 741 A.2d 16 (Del. 1999) (upholding termination fee of 3.125 percent).
122 In an analysis of ninety firms that have ERAs, one firm had a payout of approximately
11.23 percent of its equity's market value. GILSON & BLACK, supra note 1, at 768 n.43.
123 See Brazen, 695 A.2d at 49.
124 Dennis J. Block, Public Company M&A: Recent Developments in Corporate Control,
Protective Mechanisms and Other Deal Protection Techniques, in CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL 2005, at 9, 89 (Dennis J. Block & Merideth M. Brown eds., Practising Law Inst.
2005).
125 See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 1, at 768.
1261d.
127 Id.
128 Block, supra note 124, at 9, 89.
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merger negotiations. 129 The company retains valued managers rather
than deterring or thwarting takeovers.
Of course, there are risks associated with ERAs. An ERA could
tempt managers to pursue takeovers that are adverse to shareholders'
interests in order to collect their payments, or could deter companies
from pursuing friendly transactions (as it may have in the Bruckmann
Rosser deal).130 Companies considering whether to provide ERAs to
senior management should consider their purpose and risks. Under no
circumstances, however, should the company view ERAs as a de-
fense; only in small deals could the aggregate of payments be large
enough to deter a raider.' 31 Although Lone Star's ERAs may have
grown large enough to torpedo Bruckmann Rosser's acquisition of
Lone Star, this neither changed their ostensible purpose nor rendered
them invalid.
The whole point of ERAs is to provide payments in the event of a
change-in-control. All the "existing directors" provision did in
CalPERS was define a change-in-control that would trigger such
payments. Not all changes-in-control, however, create adverse conse-
quences. For example, directors may change, but their replacements
could have the same policies. Lone Star recognized this and gave
original directors the power to deprive managers of their payments if
the original directors approved enough new directors so that the com-
bination of the two represented a majority of the board. 132 This less-
ened the severity of the provision and provided a technique for the
board to reduce managers' temptation to solicit takeovers that were
adverse to shareholders' interests. This definition does not seem arbi-
trary, much less nefarious. Therefore, Lone Star's ERAs were reason-
able and valid under Delaware law. 1
33
CONCLUSION
ERAs are popular; by 2000, 70 percent of America's largest one
thousand corporations had ERAs. 13 4 Lone Star simply added a con-
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 See Cal. Pub. Emp. Retirement Sys. v. Coulter, No. 19191, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 54, at
*4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 21, 2005).
133 See id. at 21-22 ("It is reasonable that a change of control agreement have some mecha-
nism by which the corporation's obligation to make such payments can be avoided if the com-
position of the Board has changed in name only.").
134 Michael C. Jensen, Kevin J. Murphy & Eric G. Wruck, CEO Pay... And How To Fix
It 31 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Negotiation, Org. and Mkt. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No.
04-28, 2005) (providing that "70 percent of the largest 1000 companies had change-in-control
agreements in place in 2000, up from 41 percent in 1988 and 57 percent in 1996").
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tinuing director provision to its ERAs. Those ERAs reached an
amount that may have sunk a takeover, but that amount was not af-
fected by the change-in-control provision. Moreover, Lone Star was
not looking for a potent defense when it adopted the ERAs; rather, it
sought to retain valued managers during challenging times. In sum,
the ERAs did not involve a dead hand feature thereby leaving such
features where they ought to be-buried under Delaware case law.
The CalPERS court correctly determined that Lone Star's change-in-
control contractual approach was valid under Delaware law. Investors
should consider this good news.
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